The authors apply results on complementarities to theories of insurance companies' choices of ownership structure and executive compensation. They identify minimal restrictions on the interaction between firm policies and exogenous characteristics for theories to have testable implications for reduced-form regression coefficients. Obtaining testable implications for structural-equation regression coefficients requires additional identifying restrictions. The authors' analysis highlights a basic tradeoff between theory and statistical methods.
INTRODUCTION
An insurance company faces a broad array of strategic choices. It must choose its lines of business as well as its geographic reach, its organizational form, the composition of its board of directors, and the structure of its executive compensation plan, distribution system, risk management policy, and so on. While progress has been made in examining facets of these strategic policy choices, virtually all of the analyses fail to incorporate the facts that the various policies are endogenous and that many are jointly determined. This article explicitly recognizes this simultaneity and examines the requirements for a theory to have empirically testable implications for correlation and regression coefficients.
To provide unambiguous predictions for the signs of correlation and reduced-form regression coefficients, a theory of insurance companies' choices must imply monotone comparative statics. When the relation between underlying firm characteristics and choice variables is not monotonic, the theory produces ambiguous sign predictions in terms of these coefficients. In this case, although a reduced-form regression will estimate the average relation in the data, the theory is not falsifiable in that either a positive or a negative observed relation would be consistent with the theory. If the theory does not imply monotone comparative statics, then testable implications re-quire structural-equation estimation methods-but these methods require identifying restrictions.
While the requirements for monotone comparative statics are readily satisfied in models with a single choice variable, insurance companies are complex organizations that make a number of choices. When firms choose several policy variables, additional care is required in developing theory and in undertaking empirical work to analyze these choices.
Research on complementarities among policy choices has led to a more complete understanding of the requirements for monotone comparative statics, 1 but this literature has only recently begun to focus on the implications for empirical work. While Arora and Gambardella (1990) , Arora (1996) , and Athey and Stern (1998) discuss how theories about complementarities can be tested empirically, 2 these ideas have not been applied in studies of the insurance industry, even though they have important implications for research on insurance companies' strategic choices.
To keep the analysis simple, the authors model the firm's problem as focusing on two choices: ownership structure and executive compensation. The authors employ existing results on complementarities, applying these results to questions of strategic policy choices within the insurance industry. The analysis provides better interpretations of existing evidence, identifies weaknesses in existing theory, and suggests additional tests.
The following sections of this article discuss how results on monotone comparative statics can be applied to issues in the insurance industry by examining the impact of a firm's lines of business on its choices of ownership structure and executive compensation as well as implications for empirical work. The article also proposes tests of the theory.
COMPLEMENTARITIES IN INSURANCE
Lines of insurance vary in the level of required managerial discretion. For example, managerial discretion should be less important within lines for which more extensive loss data are available, the variance of losses is lower (Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993; Doherty and Dionne, 1993) , screening is less valuable (Hansmann, 1985; Smith and Stutzer, 1990) , and the legal environment for claims administration is expected to be more stable. Because the required levels of discretion differ, insurance firms operating in different lines choose different ownership structures and compensation policies. This article analyzes how these different choices interact with each other and with an insurance firm's lines of business.
Mutuals and stocks are the primary ownership structures within this industry. Mayers and Smith (1981) suggest that stock ownership is more appropriate for firms whose lines require higher levels of discretion. In addition to this direct effect of discretion on ownership, when compensation policy choices by an insurer are also considered, 1 Milgrom and Roberts (1990b) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994) focus on the theory of complementarities. Milgrom and Roberts (1990a) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) further develop the theory within the context of the organization of the firm. 2 Empirical studies for manufacturing firms include Colombo and Rocco (1995) , MacDuffie (1995) , Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) , and Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998) .
interactions among policy choices produce an indirect effect-an effect of discretion on ownership structure through its impact on compensation. Direct and indirect effects might be offsetting or reinforcing. By applying results on monotone comparative statics, the authors derive a clearer understanding of the issues faced by insurance firms and analyze how packages of choices vary with lines of business.
Lines of Business, Ownership Structure, and Executive Compensation
The authors assume that a firm maximizes value with respect to its choices of ownership structure, o, level of total executive compensation, c 1 , and sensitivity of compensation to changes in firm value, c 2 . 3 In this maximization problem, a firm takes as given its lines of business, which are ordered by required discretion, d. 4 Let O be the set of feasible ownership structures and C be the set of feasible compensation parameters. A firm's maximization problem is written as:
The Appendix employs a standard approach to deriving comparative static results; but this standard approach encounters problems. First, variables such as ownership structure are naturally discrete, so assumptions of differentiability are potentially inappropriate. Second, even with the necessary differentiability and convexity, estimation can be problematic. Estimation of the value function is difficult both because the function typically is not fully specified and because researchers generally lack good measures of firm value. While it is possible to estimate reduced-form equations consistently using OLS, this is not so for structural equations since they contain endogenous right-hand-side variables. The structural coefficients are not identified and, consequently, cannot be estimated without imposing additional restrictions on the problem. Because empirical work based on the value function or the structural equations must confront such potentially difficult estimation issues, the estimation of these equations typically has been avoided. Hence, the authors first examine predictions that can be derived for the reduced-form coefficients.
The analyses in Smith (1981, 1992) have clear implications for the signs of the coefficients in the value function, and, along with second-order conditions, direct implications for the signs of the coefficients in the structural equations. But reduced-form coefficients are composites of the underlying parameters in the value function. Even though second-order conditions allow signing the denominator, a theory is required that also allows signing the numerators in order to produce falsifi-3 Compensation policy is set by the company's board of directors. The analysis here does not attempt to model the process by which the details of executive compensation policy are selected but focuses on the coordination of selected policies and the value implications of these choices. 4 Discretion can be limited by concentrating on fewer lines of business. Other mechanisms that limit managerial discretion include charter restrictions on investments, limitations on dividends, concentration of the business by geographic area, regulatory oversight, and policy loans. The authors assume a firm's required discretion is predetermined.
able predictions for signs of the reduced-form coefficients (see the Appendix for more details). Although estimation of the reduced form poses fewer statistical problems, it places greater demands on the theory to yield unambiguous sign predictions for the estimated coefficients.
Complementarities. To impose additional structure while addressing the discreteness of ownership choices, the authors draw from the literature on complementarities. The standard definition of complements in a production process states that two inputs are complements if a decrease in the price of one causes an increase in the use of the other. Milgrom and Roberts (1990c) take this term beyond its traditional usage to describe relations among groups of activities. They define activities to be complements if doing more of one increases the marginal profitability of the others. Milgrom and Roberts' analysis highlights the fact that assumptions of differentiability and convexity are not necessary for problems that have other structure. In particular, they show that in a problem with a lattice structure, 5 having complementarities among the variables is sufficient for the monotonicity of a firm's choice variables in its exogenous characteristics. Extending the work of Milgrom and Roberts (1990c) , Milgrom and Shannon (1994) define two conditions-quasi-supermodularity and the single-crossing property-and show that these conditions are necessary and sufficient for a firm's optimal policy choices to depend monotonically on the type and choice set of the firm.
The authors consider two policy choices faced by insurance firms, ownership structure and executive compensation. For ownership structure, the authors focus on two possibilities, mutual or stock, denoted by . Further, the authors specify that required discretion can be either low, d lo , or high, d hi .
As will be seen below, the analyses in Mayers and Smith (1981 , 1988 imply that the value function for an insurance firm is quasi-supermodular and satisfies the singlecrossing property. Since these conditions are sufficient for monotone comparative statics, they imply that (given the assumed ordering on ownership structure) the level of compensation, the sensitivity of compensation to changes in the value of the business, and ownership structure are increasing in the required level of discretion. This implies firms with higher levels of required discretion will tend to choose stock ownership and firms with lower levels of required discretion will tend to choose mutual ownership.
Requirements for the Single-Crossing Property
Ownership Structure and Lines of Business as Complements. Formally, the value function satisfies the single-crossing property in ownership structure, given the lines of business, if for any c C ,
Condition (2) would be satisfied if either stock ownership decreased value for a firm operating in low-discretion lines or if stock ownership increased value for firms operating in both high-discretion and low-discretion lines. 8 This restriction on the direct effect of discretion on ownership structure is called the single-crossing property because it requires that the difference É É , ; , ; , ; , ;
are given by the pairs of points v, w, x, y, or z, then the single-crossing property is satisfied. Referring to the pair of points labeled z, the difference is negative for a firm operating in low-discretion lines and positive for one operating in high-discretion lines; hence, mutual ownership is appropriate for low-discretion lines but stock ownership is appropriate for high-discretion lines. In this case, the optimal ownership structure is increasing in managerial discretion. For w and x, É É , ; , ;
are both positive, so stock ownership is optimal for both types of firms. For v and y, both differences are negative, so mutual ownership is optimal for both types of firms. In these cases, the optimal ownership is nondecreasing in required managerial discretion. 9 The single-crossing property would not be satisfied if the difference 9 Figure 1 also illustrates the difference between the single-crossing property and a stronger property, increasing differences, which is also used in the literature on complementarities. Increasing differences is violated by pairs like u, v, and w, where the difference in values decreases as required managerial discretion increases.
FIGURE 1 Illustration of the Single-Crossing Property
Panel A illustrates cases that are consistent with single-crossing; Panel B illustrates a relation that is ruled out.
The analyses in Smith (1988, 1994) suggest that this single-crossing condition is satisfied with respect to insurer ownership structure. Stock companies have several control mechanisms that limit the dysfunctional exercise of managerial discretion. Some of these mechanisms are: (1) monitoring by capital markets (specifically by stock analysts, institutional investors, and other blockholders); (2) the threat of a takeover; and (3) the use of stock-based incentive compensation. These potentially important control mechanisms are infeasible in mutuals because mutuals do not have alienable ownership claims. Thus, stocks should have a comparative advantage over mutuals in lines that require higher discretion. The evidence presented in Mayers and Smith (1988) is consistent with these predictions. 
Executive Compensation and Lines of Business as
Thus, if firm value with high levels of expected compensation and high sensitivity to performance is less than firm value with lower expected compensation and/or less sensitivity to performance for lines that require low levels of discretion, then the precedent of Condition (3) is not satisfied and hence the condition as a whole is satisfied.
The analyses in Mayers and Smith (1992) and Smith and Watts (1992) imply that this single-crossing condition also is satisfied with respect to the level of expected total compensation and the use of incentive compensation. Executives of firms operating in lines that require high discretion have a larger impact on value from exercising discretion; hence they have a higher value of the marginal product. With competitive markets for executives, they command higher levels of compensation. Moreover, with greater discretion, compensation packages place greater weight on incentive compensation, rewarding managers more on the consequences of their actions than on their (more difficult to assess) chosen actions. The evidence presented in Mayers and Smith (1992) is consistent with these predictions.
Set of Choice Variables and Lines of Business as Complements.
A sufficient condition for the value function to satisfy the single-crossing property for the set of choice variables given the lines of business is that for all ,
.
This says that an increase in one or more of the choice variables (e.g., a move to stock ownership, an increase in compensation, or an increase in the sensitivity of compensation) decreases value for a low-discretion firm.
The analysis in Mayers and Smith (1988) implies that Condition (4) should hold: In a common stock insurance company there is a conflict of interest between stockholders and policyholders over dividend policy, financing policy, and investment policy. In a mutual, merging the two parties naturally controls this conflict. 10 However, this merger results in less effective control of the conflict between owners and executives over effort, payout policy, and risk-management activities. This conflict is partially controlled through outsider participation by the board of directors, who monitor the executives (Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith, 1997) . Outside directors can adopt the lower level of compensation and compensation sensitivity appropriate for control of owner-manager conflicts in a mutual. Thus, when required discretion is low, firm value is higher with mutual ownership: Value increases both from the internalization of owner-customer conflicts, as well as from offering a lower level of compensation and making compensation less sensitive to performance. The evidence in Mayers and Smith (1992) is consistent with these predictions.
Requirements for Quasi-Supermodularity
With both ownership structure and executive compensation as choice variables, the single-crossing property is not sufficient to generate monotone comparative-static results and thus is not sufficient to imply an unambiguous sign for the coefficients in a reduced-form regression. For example, the value-maximizing choices would not be monotonic if the indirect effect of discretion on ownership through compensation 10 The stockholder and policyholder conflict in a stock insurance company is partially controlled through mechanisms that restrict managerial discretion in certain dimensions. Thus, policies that control managerial discretion are complementary with stock-based ownership structure. more than offset the direct effect. When there are multiple choice variables, an additional condition is required to restrict the interaction among choice variables, either quasi-supermodularity or supermodularity. Together with the single-crossing property, either quasi-supermodularity or supermodularity is sufficient to ensure monotone comparative statics with respect to firm characteristics. The single-crossing property and quasi-supermodularity are necessary for monotone comparative statics with respect to characteristics and the choice set. If the value function is either quasisupermodular or supermodular, changes in choice variables are mutually reinforcing (direct and indirect effects do not have different signs), and thus optimal policy variables are nondecreasing in the level of discretion required.
Quasi-supermodularity requires that, if an increase in some policy variable increases value, then an increase in that policy variable also increases value when the other policy variables are increased. For example, quasi-supermodularity requires that, for all ,
If, for high discretion, both differences are positive, and, for low discretion, the first difference (the precedent) is negative, then this condition holds. Thus, for quasisupermodularity to hold, it is sufficient that for all 
Conditions (6) and (7) state that larger values of the choice variables decrease the value of a low-discretion firm but increase the value of a high-discretion firm. The more choice variables that are chosen appropriately, the higher is firm value-for a high-discretion firm, choosing appropriately means choosing higher values, and for a low-discretion firm, choosing appropriately means choosing lower values.
Referring to Panel A of Figure 2 , if the values of the differences É É , ; , ;
, ;
are given by the pairs of points v, w, x, y, or z, then quasisupermodularity is satisfied. Quasi-supermodularity would not be satisfied if the difference É É , ; , ;
were positive when compensation was low and negative when compensation was high, as in the pair of points labeled u in Figure 2 . In this case, direct and indirect effects are offsetting rather than reinforcing.
11 Note that Condition (6), which is part of the sufficient conditions for quasi-supermodularity, is equivalent to Condition (4), which is a sufficient condition for single crossing. 12 Although Condition (7) if C is bounded above appropriately, even without these restrictions on C, the formal condition is expected to hold.
FIGURE 2 Illustration of Quasi-Supermodularity
Panel A illustrates cases that are consistent with quasi-supermodularity; Panel B illustrates a case that is ruled out.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL TESTS
Since the authors have argued that quasi-supermodularity and single crossing hold in the problem, then the choice variables (ownership structure and compensation) are nondecreasing functions of the level of discretion required for the firm's lines of business (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994, Theorem 4) . This is consistent with the evidence presented in Smith (1988, 1992) , which suggests that firms whose lines of business require higher discretion are more likely to be stock companies that offer higher levels of compensation and make pay more sensitive to firm value. Firms whose lines require less discretion are more likely to be mutuals that offer lower levels of compensation and make pay less sensitive to firm performance.
A direct test of the theory would be to test whether the single-crossing property and quasi-supermodularity hold. However, these conditions are written in terms of the value function, which is difficult to estimate. 13 Since one generally cannot observe the value function, the authors focus on other implications of the theory. The primary implications are monotonicity results, which imply relations among variables, which are not necessarily linear. Additional restrictions on the form of the value function, in addition to these monotonicity results, provide implications for measures of linear relations between the variables, such as regression coefficients. The authors now examine these tests in more detail.
Correlation Tests
The assumptions of quasi-supermodularity and the single-crossing property imply that ownership structure, compensation policy, and the discretion required for a firm's lines of business have positive pairwise relations. This can be tested using correlation coefficients.
14 The ordinal nature of the authors' assumptions implies that results are unchanged by monotone transformations of the variables. Thus, tests based on rank correlation coefficients (e.g., Spearman and Kendall) are appropriate. Further, since some of the authors' variables are discrete, tests for independence using contingency tables may be more appropriate (see Kanji, 1995) . Also, the authors' assumptions imply that conditional correlation coefficients between ownership structure and compensation policy are positive (see Arora, 1996) . Although these tests avoid identification problems and the need for instruments, the opportunity to recover underlying structural parameters is lost. For example, to estimate a reduced form, an instrument is needed for managerial discretion; yet absent a good measure of discretion, correlations among the endogenous policy variables can still be examined.
Regression Tests
Reduced-Form Equations. More information can be extracted from a reduced-form regression than can be derived from the examination of correlation coefficients. In the reducedform equations, the authors also avoid identification problems and the need for instruments, but again the authors lose any opportunity to identify underlying structural parameters. Reduced-form equations have only exogenous variables on the right-hand side: 
Q Q
Thus, these equations can be estimated consistently using ordinary least squares or appropriate limited dependent variable techniques like logit or probit. Quasisupermodularity, single crossing, and the authors' assumptions on the form of the value function imply that slope coefficients Q Q Q 11 21 31 , , and are positive-firms with lines of business that require greater discretion have "higher" (stock) ownership structure, higher levels of compensation, and greater sensitivity of compensation to value changes.
It is important to note that a theory of organizational choices in the insurance industry can only restrict the sign of the reduced-form coefficients if the theory implies that the value function satisfies quasi-supermodularity and single crossing. For example, suppose the theory suggests that the single-crossing property is satisfied but that quasi-supermodularity is not. Then an increase in the discretion required for a firm's lines of business would directly cause optimal ownership structure and com-pensation to increase, but the increase in ownership structure would indirectly cause the optimal compensation policy to decrease. Thus, the coefficient on the discretion required for a firm's lines of business in a reduced-form compensation regression could be either positive or negative. Unless a theory implies conditions such as quasi-supermodularity and single crossing that guarantee monotone comparative statics, the theory does not have falsifiable predictions about the signs of the coefficients on the discretion variables in the reduced-form regressions. With these assumptions, the theory predicts positive signs for these coefficients. Thus, the theory the authors develop in the previous section potentially can be rejected by applying standard regression techniques to the reduced-form equations.
Structural Equations. As discussed above, one can consider estimating structural equations The single-crossing property (together with the second-order conditions and the linearity implicit in using a quadratic Taylor-series approximation-see the Appendix)
implies that the coefficients on discretion (a 1 , b 1 , and g 1 ) are non-negative (the requirement of greater discretion results in "higher" stock ownership structure, higher levels of compensation, and more sensitive compensation). Quasi-supermodularity implies that the coefficients on the level of compensation (a 2 and g 2 ) are positive (i.e., higher levels of compensation result in stock ownership and more sensitive compensation), that the coefficients on the sensitivity of compensation (a 3 and b 3 ) are positive (i.e., more sensitive compensation results in stock ownership and higher levels of compensation), and that the coefficients on ownership (b 4 and g 4 ) are positive (i.e., stock ownership results in higher levels of compensation and more sensitive compensation).
Unfortunately, OLS regressions based on these equations generally yield biased and inconsistent estimated coefficients since the equations include endogenous right-hand-side variables. 15 The coefficients in the structural equations can be identified if we have appropriate identifying variables or additional identifying assumptions. For example, if good instruments are available for ownership structure, the level of compensation, and the sensitivity of compensation, then the coefficients can be identified using an instrumental-variables approach.
Summary. The implications of our theory for the coefficients in these regressions are summarized in Table 1 . (8) 
CONCLUSION
The authors analyze how variation in insurance firms' lines of business affects the package of policy variables they choose. The analysis implies that firms with lines of business that require high-managerial discretion will tend to be stock companies and have high executive compensation that is sensitive to changes in firm value. Firms with lines of business that require low discretion will tend to be mutuals and have low executive compensation that is relatively insensitive to changes in firm value. The authors use results on complementarities to identify requirements on the interactions between policies in order for these hypotheses to be refutable using a reduced-form regression. Structural-equation regressions require more information about factors that affect the firm's policy choices. Thus, the authors' analysis highlights a basic tradeoff between the richness of a theory and the statistical methods to examine the theory. 
